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This essay reviews what economists have learned about the impact of labor market institutions, defined
broadly as government regulations and union activity on labor outcomes in developing countries. 
It finds that: 1) Labor institutions vary greatly among developing countries but less than they vary
among advanced countries.  Unions and collective bargaining are less important in developing than
in advanced countries while government regulations are nominally as important. 2) Many developing
countries compliance with minimum wage regulations  produce spikes in wage distributions around
the minimum in covered sectors.  Most studies find modest adverse effects of the minimum on employment
so that the minimum raises the total income of low paid labor. 3)  In many countries minimum wages
“spill-over” to the unregulated sector, producing spikes in the wage distributions there as well. 4) Employment
protection regulations and related laws shift output and employment to informal sectors and reduce
gross labor mobility. 5) Mandated benefits increase labor costs and reduce employment modestly while
the costs of others are shifted largely to labor, with some variation among countries. 6) Contrary to
the Harris-Todaro two sector model in which rural-urban migration adjust to produce a positive relation
between unemployment and wages across regions and sectors, wages and unemployment are inversely
related by the “wage curve”. 7)  Unions affect non-wage outcomes as well as wage outcomes. 8) Cross-country
regressions yield inconclusive results on the impact of labor regulations on growth while studies of
country adjustments to economic shocks, such as balance of payments problems, find no difference
in the responses of countries by the strength of labor institutions. 9) Labor institution can be critical
when countries experience great change, as in China’s growth spurt and Argentina’s preservation of
social stability and democracy after its 2001-2002 economic collapse. Cooperative labor relations
tend to produce better economic outcomes. 10)  The informal sector increased its share of the work
force in the developing world in the past two decades. The persistence of large informal sectors throughout
the developing world, including countries with high rates of growth, puts a premium on increasing
our knowledge of how informal sector labor markets work and finding institutions and policies to deliver









Once about a time – not so long ago – the international financial institutions and 
many in the economics and policy establishment believed that they knew how to create 
sustainable growth in developing economies. They had a tool kit of policy prescriptions that 
they could take from country to country to cure economic ills. For the labor market, the 
package called for reduced regulations and lower social protection, cuts in public sector pay 
and employment, weaker unions, and greater reliance on market wage setting compared to 
collective bargaining or administrative rules.  The enemy of growth was “urban bias” 
(Lipton, 1977) -- government or union setting of pay and work conditions that benefit 
modern sector workers but that reduce the flow of workers from low productivity informal 
and rural sectors to the modern sector.  The World Bank’s 1990 Development Report 
presented the prevailing wisdom: “Labor market policies – minimum wages, job security 
regulations, and social security – are usually intended to raise welfare or reduce exploitation. 
But they actually work to raise the cost of labor in the formal sector and reduce labor demand 
... increase the supply of labor to the rural and urban informal sectors, and thus depress labor 
incomes where most of the poor are found.” (World Bank 1990, p. 63).  
Underlying this perspective was the Harris-Todaro (1970) two-sector model that 
attributed joblessness in developing countries to institutionally imposed high urban wages.  
The model posited that the high wages induced rural workers to migrate to urban areas, 
where they became unemployed while waiting for good jobs. Migration continued until the 
rate of unemployment equated the expected urban sector earnings (the wage times the 
probability of employment) to rural earnings. In this situation, an increase in modern sector 
employment at the institutionally determined wage does not raise GDP.  This is because the 
addition of a high productivity job induces enough rural workers to migrate into urban  
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unemployment to reduce rural output by the increased output due to the new urban job.1 
 World Bank and International Monetary Fund economists also worried that labor 
institutions would undermine structural adjustment programs designed to cure balance of 
payments deficits or other economic ills.  Viewing the archetypical problem as one in which 
the developing country ran into a balance of payments deficit, they stressed the need to shift 
resources from labor-intensive non-traded goods and services to capital-intensive traded 
goods sectors.  The least costly way to do this was to devalue the currency, which would 
raise the price of tradeable goods and services relative to non-tradeable goods and services 
and thus attract resources into the traded sectors.   As long as tradeable goods were capital 
intensive, this would also shift the income distribution toward capital. The fear was that 
unions or other institutions that raised wages to preserve labor incomes would stop relative 
prices from moving in the desired direction.  Absent a price-induced shift in resources,  the 
country would have to undergo a recession to reduce imports and raise exports, which would 
be far more costly than a real devaluation.    
At the 1992 World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, I reviewed 
extant evidence that labor institutions harmed economic development and stymied 
adjustments to macro-economic problems per this analysis and found it sparse and 
unconvincing (Freeman, 1993a).  The strongest evidence was Fallon and Lucas's (1989)  
comparison of the response of employment to output and wages in 35 industries in India and 
29 industries in Zimbabwe before and after these countries strengthened labor laws.  Their 
analysis showed that industries adjusted employment to changes in output as rapidly after the 
                                                 
1   Let W be the wage in the urban sector and Wr be the wage in the rural sector. Then 
the two sectors have equal expected earnings when eW = Wr, where e is the ratio of 
employment (E) to labor force (L) in the urban sector.  Since this means that EWr = LR, dL = 
W/Wr dE.  An increase in E increases the urban work force, which in turn reduces the rural  
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laws as before the laws but that employment was lower at the same output after the laws (ie 
that productivity improved, which could be interpreted as a positive outcome).  Absent 
evidence that firms complied with the laws and that other factors did not affect outcomes 
over the same period (they noted that Zimbabwe became independent co-terminus with the 
change in labor regulations) I viewed the results as inconclusive at best.  I was more 
impressed by the large declines in real minimum wages and average earnings in many 
African and Latin American countries during the 1980s that suggested that labor regulations 
were more “sawdust” than “hardwood”.  
The quantity and quality of research on labor institutions in developing countries has 
increased greatly since the early 1990s.  Some countries changed labor regulations in ways 
that provide good pseudo-experiments of whether institutions help or hinder the working of 
labor markets.  Many countries now regularly provide researchers with micro data files on 
individuals and establishments that permit deeper probing of hypotheses than is possible with 
aggregate data.   Research institutions and individual researchers have developed new data 
sets with country labor codes and institutional practices that illuminate cross-country 
differences and provide input into cross-country growth and other regressions. 
In light of all this, what have we learned about how labor institutions affect outcomes 
in developing countries?   
The recent research has not uncovered a general law for the effects of institutions on 
outcomes – economic circumstances and institutions probably vary too much among 
countries to support any single generalization – but it has yielded new and in some cases 
surprising findings on how institutions affect outcomes. This has led to a more measured 




view of what institutions do than in the World Bank’s 1990 proclamation. Here are the main 
findings: 
1) Labor institutions vary greatly among developing countries but less than they vary 
among advanced countries.  Collective bargaining is weaker in developing countries than in 
advanced countries while labor regulations are nominally similar. 
2)  Contrary to my initial skepticism, compliance with regulations in the formal sector 
of many developing countries is sufficient that minimum wages appear to be binding. They 
produce spikes in the distribution of wages around minimum. Most studies find that 
minimum wages reduce employment sufficiently modestly so that minimums generally help 
the low paid. 
3) Contrary to Harris-Todaro type models, minimum wages induce spikes in the 
distribution of earnings in the informal sector in several countries, suggesting that minimum 
determine reservation wages of workers in those sectors. 
4) Wages and unemployment are negatively related across geographic areas, 
consistent with the wage curve and contrary to the Harris-Todaro model. 
    5) Mandated benefits increase labor costs and reduce employment modestly while the 
costs of others are shifted largely to labor, with some variation among countries. 
6) Some mandated benefits increase labor costs and reduce employment modestly 
while the costs of others are shifted largely to workers and thus presumably do not impact 
employment.   
7) Unions are associated with higher wages and non-wage shares of compensation 
and with lower turnover and less dispersion of pay.  Estimates of the union effects on profits 
and productivity differ across countries.   
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8) Cross-country regressions yield inconclusive results on the impact of labor 
regulations on growth while studies of country adjustments to economic shocks, such as 
balance of payments problems, find no difference in the responses of countries by the 
strength of labor institutions.  
The research has led analysts at the World Bank and other international institutions to 
moderate their initially negative assessments of labor institutions.
2  Readers familiar with the 
retreat of the Bank and the IMF from obiter dicta on free trade, unrestricted capital flows, and 
laissez faire policies will note that this fits with the new modesty of these institutions about 
what economists can scientifically assert about growth-inducing policies.
3  
9) Labor institution can be critical when countries experience great change, as in 
China’s growth spurt and Argentina’s preservation of social stability and democracy after its 
                                                 
2   The 1995 World Development Review was the first major Bank statement in this 
regard:  “Free trade unions are the cornerstone of any effective system of industrial relations. 
Unions act as agents for labor … monitor employers’ compliance with government 
regulations … can help raise workplace productivity and reduce workplace discrimination … 
(contribute to) … political and social development.” (World Bank 1995, p 79).  In 2003 the 
Inter-American Development Bank declared:  “Labor regulations are not cost-free, but 
deregulation is not the answer....  Unions are neither the sand in the wheels of the labor 
market nor the solution to low wages....  better labor market performance is compatible with 
lower earnings inequality ...  The new agenda requires a strengthened labor authority and a 
complex network of public and private institutions” (Inter-American Development Bank, 
2004 pp 7-8).  
3   
Indicative of this thinking: “Rising trade volumes are unambiguously related to growth, but 
the direction of causation is unclear.” Zagha, Nankini, & Gill (IMF, 2006); ”some of the 
more extreme polemic claims made about the effects of financial globalization on developing 
countries, both pro and con, are far less easy to substantiate than either side generally cares to 
admit.” Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, & Wei (IMF, 2007); “greater caution toward certain forms of 
foreign capital inflows might be warranted”– Prasad, Rajan, & Subramian (IMF, 2007); 
“expectations about the impact of reforms on growth were unrealistic…our knowledge of 
economic growth is extremely incomplete… an economic system may not always respond as 
predicted (Zagha, Nankini, & Gill, 2006).  “The Washington Consensus has been dead for 
years.” Wolfensohn (2004).  On the role of government see World Bank (1993).  
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2001-2002 economic collapse. Cooperative labor relations tend to produce better economic 
outcomes.  
10) In the 1990s-2000s, the informal sector’s share of employment increased or held 
steady in virtually all developing countries, including those with healthy growth and limited 
regulations (section 8).  Even without deregulating the formal sector, an increasing 
proportion of workers in developing countries are working in largely unregulated markets.  
1.  The Debate over Labor Institutions 
Developing countries, like advanced countries, evince substantial differences in labor 
institutions that could impact economic outcomes and growth.  To quantify this variation, I 
summarize in exhibit 1 the mean and standard deviation of five measures of the institutional 
orientation of formal sector labor markets. The five measures are: the labor component from 
the Fraser Institute’s (2006) index of economic freedom; the Botero, et al (2004) indices of 
the strength of employment laws and laws regarding collective rights; the power of firms to 
set wages and hire and fire reported in the (World Economic Forum's Globa Competitiveness 
Report (2006) and rates of unionization from the ILO (1996).  I have scaled the indices so 
that high values mean that a country relies more on market forces than on institutions in 
determining outcomes.  I differentiate developing countries by level of income and 
distinguish the traditional advanced countries (the West and Japan) from recently the 
developed  Asian Tiger economies. Appendix A gives the measures for each country.     
The average values of the measures in exhibit 1 show that developing countries have  
lower union density and are more likely to rely on firms/markets than collective 
bargaining/regulations to set wages compared to advanced countries.  The Botero et al 
measure of employment law shows stronger laws in developing countries than in advanced 
countries but the measures of hiring and firing practices, collective relations law, and the  
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overall Fraser Index show little difference between advanced and developing countries. The 
newly industrialized Asian countries are usually the most market-oriented.  The correlation 
matrix at the bottom of the exhibit shows that the four indices are  positively correlated, 
which indicates that they are measuring broadly similar phenomenon but the correlations are 
lower than what one might expect if they were good measures of the same underlying 
institutional structures.  The could reflect genuine differences in country policies or practices 
along the dimensions that each index covers or it could reflect substantial measurement error 
in the indicators.  Union density has a lower correlation to the four measures than they have 
among themselves. 
The standard deviations below the means show considerable variation in institutions 
within groups. In 5 of the 6 measures, the variation is smaller among the developing  
countries than it is among the advanced countries.  This is due to the divergence between the 
market-oriented US and the other English-speaking countries and the more institution-
oriented countries in the European Union (Freeman, Boxall, Haynes, 2007).  Finally, to the 
extent that institutions distort the operation of labor markets per the 1990 World Bank 
statement, the measures suggest that labor markets work better in some developing countries 
than in some advanced countries. By the Fraser Institute’s index for labor, for example, the 
Ugandan labor market should work better than the German or Swedish labor markets.  
Since institutions usually reduce dispersion of earnings across and among groups, 
another way to assess the importance of institutions in advanced and developing countries is 
to compare the dispersion of earnings among nominally similar workers.  Exhibit 2 graphs 
the standard deviation of ln earnings among occupations and industries in countries by GDP 
per capita. It shows greater dispersion in lower income countries than in high income 
countries.  To the extent that high dispersion reflects informational or other market failures,  
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institutions have greater scope to improve outcomes in developing countries than in advanced 
countries. To the extent that the lower dispersion reflects institutionally-enforced 
compression of wages from ideal market levels, on the other hand, the higher dispersion in 
low income countries might reflect better performing labor markets, per the Fraser Institute 
rating of the Ugandan market compared to those of EU countries.   
Theoretical perspectives 
Economists use three types of theories to analyze labor institutions.   
The first, which I have labelled distortionism, views institutions as distorting  
otherwise ideal competitive market equilibrium. Consider analyses of unionism in a market 
where wages are at the competitive level and the union bargains for higher wages. The higher 
cost of labor leads unionized firms to reduce employment, which forces some workers to 
move to lower paid less productive non-union work, lowering economic efficiency. The 
higher the elasticity of demand for labor, the greater is the distortion in resource allocation.  
The second type of theory treats institutions as mechanisms for efficient bargaining. 
Models of efficient bargaining predict that when firms/workers bargain they “leave no money 
on the table” and thus allocate resources optimally. This is the Coase Theorem at work in the 
world of labor institutions (Freeman, 1993b).  This analysis suggests that institutionally 
determined rules, such as employment protection legislation, affect distribution but not 
production.  More modestly, it suggests that through legal arrangements or shadow economy 
side-payments, there are “natural limits to the efficiency losses engendered by such 
regulations” (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997). 
The third type of theory focuses on ways institutions facilitate the flow of information 
and foster cooperative behaviour that could raise productivity.   In this vein Freeman and 
Lazear (1995) modelled works councils as institutions that increase communication inside  
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firms and allow management and labor to make more informed and presumably better 
decisions.   In addition, when dispersion of pay is high for non-competitive reasons such as 
monopsony (Manning, 2003), informational failures, or other factors, collective bargaining or 
government regulations can bring wages closer to the market-clearing level.   
In sum, there are arguments that institutions reduce efficiency, do not affect 
efficiency, and raise efficiency.  To determine which arguments are valid requires evidence 
on the links between institutions and outcomes that isolate the effect of institutions compared 
to other economic forces. On the basis of extant micro-data and statistical tools, I use a five-
fold sieve for evaluating research on the impact of institutions: 
1) The institution should affect the targeted outcome.  For instance, if the policy is a 
minimum wage, and the minimum is enforced, it should change the distribution of wages, 
producing a spike in frequency around the minimum. If an institution does not affect the price 
or quantity on which it is targeted it is likely to be a pro forma symbolic policy that is not 
implemented.  For example, a government may have strong labor codes consistent with the 
Conventions of the International Labor Organization but allot no resources to enforce those 
codes and not impact outcomes. 
2) Evidence that the institution alters quantities.   Assuming that an institution affects 
the targeted outcome, it is critical to determine whether it reallocates resources or simply 
alters wages with no discernible impact on quantities.  If it reallocates resources it is 
potentially distortionary.  If it alters wages but not quantities, it could be efficiently 
redistributing income while leaving output unchanged, per efficient bargaining models. In the 
minimum wage case the critical evidence is the effect, if any, on  employment. 
3)  Evidence that the outcome attributed to the institution did not occur in another 
setting absent the institution.  This applies a difference in difference analysis by treating the  
 
12
setting in which the new institution operates as the treatment and some setting where it does 
not operate as the control.  Since many countries, sectors, or workers without an institution 
can serve as a counter-factual, there is a danger that the selection of one counter-factual 
rather than another may determine the conclusion.  To minimize such dangers, the analysis 
should demonstrate that outcomes in the control were highly correlated with outcomes in the 
affected group before the institutional change (Abadie et al., 2007).  Otherwise, the control is 
unlikely to be a good guide to how the affected group might have fared absent the policy.   
4) Evidence that the estimated effect of the institution is sufficiently large to affect 
aggregate  development.  In advanced countries most workers are in the formal sector  
finding that an institution affects outcomes means that it will have a widespread impact.  In 
developing countries where the share of the work force in the formal sector is small 
institutions are unlikely to affect aggregate outcomes unless they have very large effects on 
the formal sector, sizeable spillovers to the informal sector, or are located in sectors that may 
be particularly important for economic development, for instance traded goods.  
5.  Identification of an institutional innovation from outcome data.  This is a “double 
blind test” in which the researcher looks at outcome measures as if he/she had no knowledge 
of any institutional change and identifies the period/country where the institution was at 
work.  It is based on Andrews’ (1993) test for structural changes in time series data with 
unknown change points. Ideally, the outcome data show a break that lines up with the change 
of policy that may have caused the break. In cross country time series growth data, the 
question would be whether the growth record of countries would identify those that adopted  
economic reforms that are supposed to help growth. It tests whether any innovation is 
sufficiently important to affect outcomes when other factors are also at workl.  
2. Micro-evidence on minimum wages   
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The response of employment to minimum wages depends on the shape of  the labor 
demand schedule in the range of the minimum.  For all its contentiousness, the literature on 
minimum wages in the US and other advanced countries generally finds modest responses in 
employment (Card and Krueger (1997); Neumark and Wascher, 2006).  The evidence that 
employment responses are often negligible does not mean that demand curves do not slope 
downward nor that a high minimum wage cannot decimate employment.  Rather, it suggests 
that governments set minimum wages with due consideration to the risk that minima can 
cause more harm than good.   
The studies summarized in Exhibit 3 find that in many developing countries, 
minimum wages raise the pay of low paid workers in the formal sector by enough to produce 
spikes in the distribution of earnings and that changes in the minimum change the wages for 
low paid covered groups.  Studying compliance in Indonesia. Harrison and Scorse (2003)  
report that during the 1990s epoch of globalization compliance increased in both 
multinationals and domestic firms.   With respect to  employment, most studies find that 
minimum wages  had modest adverse effects on employment, with however considerable 
variation across countries and studies, even by the same analyst.  Alatas and Cameron (2003) 
and Rama (2001) found that employment effects in Indonesia were limited to small firms.  
Bell (1997) found larger employment effects in Columbia than in Mexico. Analysing Brazil, 
Lemos (2007) found no employment effects in the public or private sectors, while earlier 
reporting small negative long run employment effects and  modest negative employment 
effects in the formal and informal sector  (Lemos 2004a, 2004b)s.  Gindling and Terrell 
(2007a) estimated an elasticity of employment to the minimum in Costa Rica of -0.10 but 
estimated an elasticity of employment to the minimum in neighboring Honduras greater than 
-1.0 (Gindling and Terrell, 2007b).  Studies that use panel data to identify the workers  
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directly impacted by the minimum find larger employment effects than studies that estimate 
the effect from employment statistics for a wider group, but whether the differences among 
countries reflect differences in  labor markets and in enforcement or in research designs is 
difficult to tell.  
That most studies obtain elasticities considerably less than unity implies that increases 
in the minimum have the potential for being a viable anti-poverty tool. Analysing the link 
between minimum wages and poverty in 22 developing countries Lustig and McCleod (1997) 
find that changes in real minimum wages are associated with declines in poverty, which 
requires that the elasticity of demand be low.   The high elasticity found  for Honduras is a 
striking exception, indicating that each country case (and each potential change in the 
minimum in each country) must be considered carefully.    
Studies that have examined the pattern of change in minimum wages as an 
endogenous variable raise doubts about the standard assumption that changes in minimum 
wages are exogenous to market conditions.  Looking at changes in real minima wages in 23 
developing countries in the 1980s-1990s, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput found declines in 
the real minimum in 16 countries.  Presumably governments allowed real minima to fall 
because they believed that in times of economic crisis falling real minima saved jobs. Rama 
(2000) shows that African counties in the CFA zone changed minimum wages in response to 
changes in the terms of trade, national output, and consumer prices. 
The big surprise in studies of minimum wages in developing countries is a substantial 
body of evidence from Latin America that minimum wages raise wages in the informal sector 
as well as in the covered sector (Gindling and Terrell, 2005, Lemos, 2004b, Kristensen and 
Cunningham, 2006; Maloney and Nunez Mendez, 2003). In Brazil this is known as the 
“Efeito Farol” or lighthouse effect.  In some cases, increases in the minimum appear to raise  
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wages more in the informal sector than in the formal sector.  This effect runs counter to the  
model that economists often use to analyse minimum wages, in which labor displaced from 
covered employment moves to the uncovered sector and depresses wages there.  
One interpretation of the positive wage spillover is that workers base their reservation 
wages on the minimum, perhaps because the high dispersion of pay in developing countries 
provides little guidance as to what wage they might expect. If low paid workers in the 
informal sector are paid less than low paid workers in the formal sector, their wages would 
increase more if the minimum induced all workers to have the same reservation wage.  But 
perhaps something else is going on that is not captured in the model
4 or perhaps the measures 
of wages in the informal sector are poor.  In any case, the results devastate the application of 
the standard model to understanding what minimum wages do in developing countries. 
3 Wage Curve 
The wage curve is an empirical relation between wages (w) and unemployment (u) 
that is usually written in log-log form: ln w = a + b ln u + X, where X refers to other factors 
that affect wages (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).  Fit with cross section data across 
regions, the wage curve tests the prediction of the Harris-Todaro two-sector model that high 
wages induce unemployment due to the migration of rural labor to high wage cities  contrary 
to the finding in advanced countries that wages are lower when unemployment is higher as 
wages fall to equilibrate the supply-demand imbalance.5  If estimated wage curves had the 
                                                 
4     In a general equilibrium closed economy the minimum would shift capital as well 
as labor to the informal sector, which could raise wages there if the shift raised its 
capital/labor ratio.   
 
5     Note that the inverse relation indicates that the adjustment process is 
insufficiently powerful to clear the labor market and eliminate the correlation in the time 
frame covered. There is debate about the applicability of the wage curve analysis to the US, 
but US studies also find unemployment and wages positively related.    
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opposite sign in developing countries from those in advanced countries this would signal a 
major difference between labor markets. Migration would dominate the link between wages 
and unemployment in developing countries whereas wage adjustments to unemployment 
would dominate the link in advanced countries. 
Between 1993 and mid 2007 researchers estimated wage curves for 13 developing 
non-transition economies: Argentina (Galiana, 1999), Brazil (Amadeo and Camargo, 1997), 
Chile (Berg and Contreras, 2004); Mexico (Castro Lugo, 2006), Uruguay (Bucheli and 
Gonzalez, 2007) in Latin America, Burkina Faso (Lachaud, 1998), Cote D’Ivoire (Hoddinott, 
1996), South Africa (Kingdon and Knight, 1998, 2006), in Africa; and Turkey (Ilkkaracan 
and Raziye, 2003), Korea (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), Taiwan (Rodgers and Nataraj, 
1999) China (Sabin, 1999; Wu 2004), India (Bhalotra, 1993).  These studies obtain negative 
coefficients on ln unemployment of the same order of magnitude as the coefficients in 
advanced countries – an elasticity of about -0.10.  The negative estimated relation between 
unemployment and wages implies that the Harris-Todaro model does not represent labor 
markets in the developing countries in the period covered.  
6 
This conclusion is consistent with analyses of labor market adjustments in the 1990s 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, whose experience motivated the model.  For South Africa Kingdon 
and Knight (2004) reject the two sector story of urban joblessness on the grounds that 
unemployed workers do not forego informal sector jobs to search for a high wage urban job.  
Similarly, Rama’s (2000) analysis of the CFA African countries rejected ”the hypothesis that 
labour market policies and institutions were the obstacles preventing wages in the formal 
sector from adjusting to a more unfavorable international context” (p. 495).  Summarizing 
                                                 
6 See Babecky, Ramos and Sanromá (2008) for a meta-analysis of wage curves that cover all 
countries that is consistent with this conclusion for developing countries.  
 
17
research on African labor markets, Kingdon, Sandefur, and Teal (2006) conclude that real 
wages were “more downwardly flexible than previously thought and … surprisingly 
responsive to unemployment rates” though large wage differentials remain between the 
formal and informal sectors.  Sizable flows of labor between the informal and formal sector 
in some countries also argues against the Harris-Todaro model. 
In short, the evidence rejects the two sector model that makes institutions the prime 
cause of divergences between earnings and productivity among sectors and of the large pay 
differences among industries and occupations shown in exhibit 2.  Given that the two sector 
model does not fit reality, we must seek look elsewhere for the causes of the great dispersion 
of pay in developing countries: Efficiency wages or gift exchanges? Implicit profit sharing 
between firms and workers? Unmeasured differences in human capital?  Transportation or 
communication problems that make the sectors separate islands in the economy and raise the 
costs of search?  The door is open for innovative analyses. 
4.  Employment Regulations  
Employment protection legislation (EPL) seeks to protect the jobs of current 
employees by requiring that firms pay severance if they lay them off.  Many laws also require 
the firm to gain approval for dismissals from a labor court or works council.  Closely related 
regulations forbid firms from hiring replacements during a labor dispute and guarantee 
workers the right to return to work after the dispute. The regulations essentially deal with 
property rights at work – whether the worker or the firm “owns” the job. Regulations that 
give greater ownership to workers should reduce job turnover and tilt market outcomes 
toward experienced workers against new entrants, whereas those that give greater ownership 
to firms tilt outcomes toward capital and more mobile younger workers.  Still, by making  
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layoffs more expensive, EPL increases the cost of hiring workers (whom the firm may lay off 
in the future), which risks reducing total employment.  
For advanced countries, two decades of studies spurred by the OECD have quelled 
the fears that EPL greatly affects employment.  Most studies find that EPL laws redistribute 
employment to incumbent workers with no clear impact on aggregate employment or 
unemployment (OECD, 2004, 2006).7 For developing countries, research has just begun.  In 
Latin America, job security provisions and costs of dismissals are extensive and thus more 
costly than in advanced OECD countries (Heckman and Pages 2000).  Even so, studies of    
EPL legislation that compare employment before and after changes in the law and/or between 
covered and uncovered groups in particular countries  find effects on total employment in 
some countries but not in others.  The strongest country evidence for effects of laws is for  
Columbia.  In 1990 Columbia lowered severance pay and gave firms greater latitude to lay 
off workers.  Using the Colombian National Household Survey, Kugler (2004) found that the 
weakened EPL was associated with growth of employment and a decline in job tenure in the 
formal sector relative to the informal sector and with increased job separations and hires in 
the formal sector.  This churning induced a modest fall in unemployment duration and 
aggregate unemployment.   
By contrast, studies of EPL legislation for Chile find no such effects in  time series 
data (Edwards and Edwards 2000) and household data (Montenegro and Pages 2004).  
Montenegro and Pages find that EPL regulations shift employment from young unskilled 
workers to senior skilled workers as in advanced countries. Petrin and Sivadasan's (2006) 
analysis of establishment data shows no impact of Chile’s 1991 and 1994 changes in 
                                                 
7    In 2004 the OECD summarized the literature as saying that “the evidence of the role 
played by EPL on aggregate employment and unemployment rates remains mixed” (p 81)  
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employment regulations on employment, the number of hires and fires, or the speed of 
employment adjustment, though they estimate that wages and marginal productivity changed 
in ways that they attribute to changing EPL laws.8 
Using firm-level data sets for 16 countries, including five Latin American countries, 
Haltwanger, Scarpetto, and Schweiger (2008) show that gross job flows (the sum of jobs 
created and jobs destroyed) range from 25 to 30 percent and vary similarly by size of firm 
and industry across countries. Using the US as the metric for what a relatively unregulated 
competitive labor market would produce they find that flows in the other countries are lower 
than in the US and relate the differences to measures of labor regulations.  Latin American 
regulations are comparable to European Union regulations and both the Latin American and 
EU countries have lower gross flows than the US.  However, it is the entry and exit of firms 
rather than the employment behavior of existing firms that underlies this difference, which 
they term “somewhat surprising from a theoretical perspective (p 26)”.  Given the high level 
of gross job flows in all of the countries, it is unclear whether any regulation-induced 
difference in job flows adversely impacts net job reallocation or efficiency.   
  Several studies have looked at how India's labor laws affect outcomes in the formal 
sector, exploiting the fact that labor regulations vary across states and over time.  Besley and 
Burgess (2003) created an index of changes in the laws governing employment protection 
and industrial disputes for Indian states from 1947 to 1997 and made before-after contrasts of 
employment and output in states that did/did not change the laws and between the formal and 
informal sector within states.  Their main specification showed that pro-worker regulations 
                                                 
8     I find their direct analyses of employment and hiring more convincing than their 
interpretation of their estimated gap between wages and marginal productivity, hich show a 
rise in the gap after the 1984 change in regulations but not after the 1991 change and a rise in 
the gap for blue collar workers in 1995 when the law did not change.   
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induced firms to shift employment and output from the formal to the informal sector,.9    
although they report that results “are not robust to including state-specific time trends.” 
(Besley and Burgess, fn 21).  Bhattacharjea (2006) criticizes the index as being based on: 1) 
misreading legal changes in three states (Andhra Pradesh; Maharashtra, Rajasthan); 2) coding 
laws so that passing three laws in one year in one direction counts less than passing the same 
laws in three separate years; 3) failing to take account of the way state labor laws interact 
with other labor laws. The result is that some of the patterns “stand out for anyone who is 
reasonably familiar with India”: Kerala, known as pro-labor, is coded as pro-employer while 
Gujarat and Maharashtra, known as pro-employer, are coded as pro-worker.   
  Ahsan and Pages (2008) report, however, that the results are robust to Bhattacharjea's 
amended measures.  They find that the laws that regulate the procedures for the resolution of 
industrial disputes have more robust and greater effects on formal sector output and 
employment than those relating to employment protection legislation.  Neither Burgess & 
Besley nor Ahsan and Pages find any gains to workers from the legislation, which raises 
questions about the purpose of these regulations: why have EPL or .  Finally, looking at the 
effect of regulations in the context of trade liberalization, Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy 
(2007) find that states with greater regulations have smaller elasticities of labor demand, 
which suggests that the laws may protect jobs by reducing flexibility. Overall, Indian labor 
institutions come closer to fitting the 1990 World Bank view that regulations do more harm 
than good than the institutions in other countries, though their impact is limited on the 
aggregate economy due to the huge size of the Indian informal sector.  
                                                 
9    Indicative of the political sensitivity of the analyses, the Indian Ministry of Finance 
misread the study as showing that “states which have more pro-worker regulations lost out on 
industrial production” when the finding is that more pro labor laws shifted production to the 
informal sector, conditional on omitting state time trends, as cited by Bhattacharjea, 2006.  
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5.  Mandated benefits 
Mandated benefits are non-wage compensation (social insurance, compensation for 
injuries at the job, maternity leave, vacation or holiday pay, and so on) that governments 
require firms to provide workers or to pay taxes for government provision.  Employers often 
complain about the cost of the benefits as if they are add-ons on wages.  But if workers desire 
the benefit and if wages are flexible workers will pay part and possibly the full cost through 
lower wages.  Summers (1989) argued that mandated benefits can be a more cost-effective 
way to deliver public goods than government provision through general taxes. Studies of the 
incidence of mandated benefits for advanced countries show that workers bear the full 
incidence in some cases (Gruber, 1997a) and a sizable share of the cost in others (Gruber and 
Krueger (1991), Ooghe, Schokkaert, and Flechet (2003)). Workers are more likely to bear a 
large proportion of the cost when they value the benefit highly. 
Many developing countries mandate benefits for workers.  Most Latin American and 
Caribbean countries use payroll taxes to fund retirement, work injury benefits, and health 
care in national social insurance systems.  Most have paid vacations, and some have 
maternity leave as well as other benefits that could increase the cost of labor. Analyses of the 
incidence of mandated benefits in Latin America give different results by benefit and 
country. Gruber (1997b) estimated that when Chile switched funding social security from 
payroll taxes to general revenues, the reduction in payroll taxes was passed entirely onto 
workers in the form of higher wages. This implies that the payroll taxes had no effect on 
labor demand. But using a similar methodology In Colombia, Kugler and Kugler (2003) find 
modest shifting of the payroll tax, which implies that the tax raised the cost of labor in the 
formal sector, and affected demand. When Colombia changed its mode of funding severance 
pay from a pay-as-you-go system to private accounts in which the employer deposited a  
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proportion of the worker’s wage, Kugler (2002) estimated that 60% to 80% of the cost shifted 
to workers in the form of lower wages.  This suggests that under the pay-as-you-go system 
workers were dubious that firms would pay severance if financial difficulties forced layoffs 
whereas the private accounts guaranteed that they would get severance pay.  
6  Union Effects 
Developing country unions range from China’s All Chinese Federation of Trade 
Unions, a government controlled agency that seeks to advance worker interests within  
bounds set by the Communist party to Korea's aggressive independent enterprise unions to 
Peronist unions in Argentina to South Africa's COSATU, which played a major role in the 
anti-apartheid struggle.  Most developing country unions are weak.  Many are more involved 
in political activity than in collective bargaining.  But enough unions in developing countries 
engage in collective bargaining to enable researchers to examine what unions do to wages in 
the tradition of Lewis (1963, 1986) and what they do to non-wage outcomes in the tradition 
of Freeman and Medoff (1984).   
Because data is limited, however, many studies estimate union effects from small non 
representative samples and most compare outcomes between union and nonunion 
workers/firms with similar characteristics rather than undertaking more methodologically 
preferable longitudinal analyses of workers or workplaces that change union status.  The one 
advantage of studying union effects in developing countries is that in some countries 
governments have changed drastically their treatment of unions in short periods of time – for 
instance from outlawing collective bargaining and restricting unions to allowing them to 
operate freely, which offers the rare opportunity to compare the functioning of a union-free 
economy to an economy with free unions.  
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Exhibit 4 summarizes the findings on the link between unionism and economic 
outcomes in the countries for which I found quantitative studies.   
The most extensive work is on Mexico.  Estimated union/nonunion wage differentials 
ranges from 5% or less to 10%-15%, with unions having their biggest effect on the wages of 
lower paid workers. This implies that they reduce wage dispersion and inequality. Popli 
(2006) confirms this result but reports that the lower dispersion of pay between union and 
nonunion workers narrowed from 1984 to 2000.  Comparing unionized and nonunion 
establishments, Fairris (2005, 2006) finds that unionism is associated with a higher share of 
compensation to non-wage payments and more training of workers; with lower quits in 
foreign-owned firms (though not in Mexican-owned firms).  Union firms have higher 
productivity and comparable profits as in nonunion firms.  In contrast, Maloney and Ribeiro 
(1999) estimate that unions increase employment in Mexico, which suggests that they lower 
productivity.  Absent longitudinal changes in union status, however, these patterns could 
reflect selectivity of unionized firms rather than any causal impact of unions on firm 
performance.  
For Brazil, Arbache estimates a union wage premium in manufacturing on the order 
of 5% to 7%, but also finds, contrary to most studies, higher wage dispersion among union 
workers than among nonunion workers. Menezes-Filho et al (2005) estimates that union 
density within Brazilian manufacturing firms is associated with a union wage effect of 12%, 
and that unionized firms have lower productivity and profitability but that union firms that 
introduced profit-sharing schemes had substantial increases in productivity and profits.  The 
studies for other Latin American countries, based on small surveys, find that unions are 
associated with lower productivity or profits.  The study for Peru reports lower profits but 
comparable productivity in unionized firms as in nonunion firms, which implies that the  
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unions must have gained higher wages. The study for Guatamala finds 10% lower 
productivity among unionized coffee plantations in a sample of 37 large plantations but finds 
no union/nonunion differential in productivity in the five plantations that changed union 
status over the period.   
Quantitative studies of unions in Africa have concentrated on wage effects. In  
South Africa, unions appear to raise wages by 10% to 20%. Since South Africa has high 
unemployment, one might be tempted to blame the unemployment on high union wages per 
the Harris-Todaro model but Butcher and Rouse note that the union share of the South 
African work force is too small for the estimated wage effects to explain the country’s 
unemployment.  The wage curve for South Africa shows an inverse relation between wages 
and unemployment.  In other African countries, Blunch and Verner (2004) estimate that 
unions raise wages by about 6% in Ghana, with the effect coming largely from higher wages 
for lower paid workers while Verner reports a larger union-nonunion differential in Ghana of 
16%.  Tsafack-Nanfosso (2007) estimates a union/nonunion wage differential of about 14% 
in the Cameroon
10 and finds that the standard deviation of log earnings among unionized 
workers is considerably lower than among nonunion workers.   
  Three studies find lower wages among unionized worker in Africa.  Estimates for 
Zimbabwe show higher productivity as well as lower pay in union workplaces, which is not 
easily reconcilable with other research (Verner, 1999). Estimates for the Cameroon give 
lower union wages in 1993 and 1994 (Thomas and Vallee, 1996).  Estimates for Senegal find 
lower union wages in 1980-85 (Terrell and Svejnar, 1989). Since it makes little sense for  
                                                 
10    He reports a 51% union wage effect using a selectivity term, but has no way to 
identify the likelihood of being union beyond functional form. Models of this type often yield 
extremely high or low estimates that reflect the absence of any genuine instrumental variable. 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1982).   
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independent unions to negotiate lower wages for members, in all of these cases, the unions 
are presumably not “normal unions” doing collective bargaining. At various times, 
governments in these countries suppressed independent unions or ran unions as appendages 
of the governing party.11 What is needed is a study of the circumstances and behavior of 
African trade unions to inform the quantitative analyses. 
        Turning to Asia, Malaysian unions operate primarily at the establishment level because 
the government restricts industrial unions. Using establishment data Standing (1992) finds 
that unions reduce skill differentials and lower quits, and are associated with higher 
productivity, more product and process innovations, more firm-sponsored training, and 
greater enrollment in a pension plan. The differences between the outcomes for firms with 
and without unions far exceed the differences in outcomes between firms with plant level 
unions and those that had industrial level unions. Bhandari's (2008) data on the wage 
differences between union and nonunion Indian workers based on a small (551 person) 
sample reports differences of wages 6%  for contractual workers and 25% for permanent 
workers.
12   
  Like Malaysia,  Korean unions are largely enterprise based, with membership 
restricted to regular employees.  Studies compare wage and other outcomes between  regular 
employees in firms with and without collective bargaining agreements, and between non-
regular workers between those firms as well.  The estimated impact of Korean unions on 
wages is in the low single digits.  Fields and Yoo (2000) found that the union differential 
doubled during the period of rapid union growth, but this was from a modest 3% to a still 
                                                 
11   Unions in Senegal and Cameroon have been in conflict with governments over time, 
and the unions in Zimbabwe have long opposed the Mobutu dictatorship   
12   Using a regression model decomposition, he reports  a 57% union wage effect for permanent workers. 
This   appears to reflect the way the decomposition treats  huge differences in regional and migration 
characteristics between union and nonunion workers.     
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modest 6%.  Park (2006) reports a union differential of 5% for all workers, larger for women 
(12%) than for men (2%), but also finds that non-standard workers, who are excluded from 
the enterprise union, are paid less in union establishments.  Unionism is also associated with 
greater employment of non-standard workers, suggesting that firms substitute them for more 
expensive union labor. Using a 1991 survey of establishments, Kleiner and Yee (1997) 
estimated the impact of unions and works councils deemed ‘effective’ by management and 
labor leaders on non wage outcomes.  They found lower turnover, similar productivity and 
lower job satisfaction among workers in the unionized settings. By contrast, they found that 
works councils were positively associated with productivity and satisfaction. Both unions and 
works councils appear to have affected decisions about terminations and downsizing.  
  The country which experienced the most striking change in union status is Uruguay.   
From 1973 to 1984 Uruguay’s military dictatorship outlawed collective bargaining. The 
return of democracy gave unions the right to bargain with employers, first under a tripartite 
system in which unions, management, and government bargained together (1985 to 1991, 
covering  some 60% of production workers), and later by management and unions without 
government involvement.  Labor market outcomes differed with these regime shifts.  During 
the dictatorship real wages fell 49 percent while the rate of unemployment varied cyclically, 
reaching 16% in 1983.  Thereafter  unions raised wages, which induced firms to invest in 
capital.  Unionized firms had sufficiently higher productivity that firms suffered no profits 
loss (Cassoni, Labadie, and Fachola, 2005). Using establishment data, Cassoni, Allen, and 
Labadie (2000) found that elasticities of employment to output and wages were lower with 
collective bargaining than in the union-free environment, suggesting that unions reduced 
employment flexibility.   
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   Korea, like Uruguay, has had distinct regimes governing unionization. Before Korea 
achieved democracy in 1987, the government allowed only an official union movement to 
operate and used state police powers to assist employers in labor disputes. Democracy 
brought with it a near doubling of union membership but union density fell in the 1990s and 
2000s (Jeong, table 2.1, 2007).  Some Korean unions formed a second more militant 
federation, and the older federation became more aggressive as well.  Governments have tried 
unsuccessfully to ameliorate the intensity of disputes by establishing Tripartite Committees 
for social dialogue and requiring that firms introduce works councils.  Wages increased 
greatly during democraticization and income inequality fell but the 1997Asian financial crisis 
weakened union strength.  Real wages fell by 9.3% in 1998, as unions agreed to low nominal 
wage changes despite high inflation.  Jeong’s (2007, chapter 4) analysis of collective 
bargaining contracts shows that the unions shifted from seeking wage gains to protecting 
jobs.  Lee and Na’s (2004)1999 survey of 300 firms found only a weak union impact on firm 
responses to the crisis: unionized firms were more likely to downsize through retirements 
than layoffs.  
  Finally, taking a more aggregate approach, Feldmann (2009) related the reports of 
executives in the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report on the quality of 
labor-management relations to aggregate unemployment.  With measures of labor relations 
for 1995 to 2003, he conducted a longitudinal regression analysis with country-specific 
random effects that shows that cooperative relations reduce unemployment, as does flexible 
labor regulations as reported by executives.  
In sum, research finds that unions are associated with higher wages (save for the 
African studies noted), higher non-wage compensation, lower dispersion of earnings (save 
for the Brazilian study noted), reduced quits and greater training. But the studies show  
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varying relations between unions and productivity or profitability across studies and 
countries.  While this variation is consistent with the notion that what unions do differs 
across countries,  it also reflects differences between the often small surveys and groups 
covered and limitations of the study designs.  
7 Cross country evidence  
  Many economists are dubious about what we can learn from cross-country growth 
regressions.
13   The data sets are small, the measures of institutions are often weak, and our 
knowledge of economics is too limited to identify the “right” model for analyzing how an 
institutional intervention affects an entire economic system.  Analysts have trouble pinning 
down the effects of education or trade on growth in cross-country regressions (Krueger and 
Lindahl 2001; Rodriguez and Rodrik 1999) so what hope is there of uncovering the more 
subtle effects of labor institutions?  These are valid concerns but since the bottom line in 
development is growth, there is something to be learned from regressions of growth rates on  
measures of labor institutions.  
One strand of cross-country analyses focused on labor institutions uses data from the 
World Bank’s Data Base of Labor Market Indicators Across Countries (Rama and Artecona 
2002).  This data base contains measures of indicators of institutions such as the number of 
ILO conventions a country has ratified, the level of minimum wages, mandated days of 
maternity leave, union and government shares of the work force.  Because the data are sparse, 
Forteza and Rama (2001) average the four measures to form an aggregate indicator of 
                                                 
13     T.N. Srinivasan (National Academy of Sciences, 2004) worries about “data of 
varying quality from disparate economies … (subject to) … measurement errors and biases 




institutional “rigidity” for 1970-1999 and warn analysts that “time-variant indicators of labor 
market rigidity cannot be used in the empirical analysis”.   
By the indicators measure, the ten most flexible labor markets: South Africa, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Tanzania; and China, Hong Kong, Jordan, Indonesia, and Chile.  The ten 
most rigid labor markets include France, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, and four former Soviet 
bloc countries, Hungary, Belarus, Krygyz Republic, Bulgaria, and Algeria and Uruguay. I list 
the countries to highlight the problems with categorizations of this type.  There is remarkable 
institutional variation among countries at both ends of the flexibility spectrum.   In the 
flexible group, South Africa has strong trade unions and an extensive labor code based on 
those in Europe, whereas unions could barely operate in Idi Amin’s Uganda or Robert 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe; China did not have a working labor market until the 1990s while Hong 
Kong had a free market under British law. In the inflexible group, Belarus is a residual 
Soviet-style dictatorship, Hungary is part of the EU, Denmark is famed for high labor 
mobility and “flexicurity” while France relies extensively on minimum wages. Changes in 
labor regulations in Uruguay, the ex-Soviet countries, the African countries, and China 
suggest that no single index can capture their institutions over the entire period. Given these 
measurement issues, institutions would have to be incredibly powerful to show up as 
determinants of growth in cross country regressions. 
Forteza and Rama (2001) test whether their measures of rigidity were associated with 
the success of World Bank adjustment programs. They do this by interacting the indices with 
dummy variables for the timing of World Bank credits and loans and entering the interaction 
terms into regressions of the growth of GDP per capita.  The idea is that countries that obtain  
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Bank loans/credits should increase growth more if they have less rigid labor markets.
14 
Growth regressions with fixed country effects yield, however, similar coefficients on the 
labor rigidity index before and after receipt of Bank aid.15  Decomposing the index into its 
separate parts, Forteza and Rama find that different indicators have different relations with 
growth: “relatively high minimum wages are associated with better economic performance 
before adjustment” (p 24) while union and government shares of the work force were 
associated with slower growth before and after the receipt of loans.16   
Ignoring the warning that the Labor Market indicators data should not be used as 
time-variant measures, Calderon and Chong (2005) create rigidity indices over time to 
conduct a panel analysis of growth rates. For developing countries their panel regressions 
with country fixed effects show that the number of ILO conventions has a large negative 
effect on growth, while the average of indicators has little effect.  Models estimated with 
generalized method of moments with instrumental variables show stronger negative effects 
on growth,17 but regressions that relate growth over the entire period to the average 
indicators find that one of the four measures is positively related to growth while the others 
have no significant relation.   
                                                 
14   Someone skeptical of the value of Bank assistance and advice might argue the 
opposite but the regressions show that growth rates tend to improve after receipt of Bank 
assistance.  
15    For instance, the estimated coefficient in table 5 on the interaction terms for the 
aggregate rigidity indicator on the years right before a program is -.094 while the coefficient 
on the years right after the program is -.097 -- a negligible difference of .003.   
16    These measures are negatively associated with growth rates only when industrial 
countries are included in the data set. (Forteza and Rama, p 23)  
17   By contrast, for advanced countries, the indices have negative impacts on growth 
regardless of the statistical methodology, which reflects the less rapid growth of institution-
driven EU countries than of the more market driven US and other English-speaking 
countries.    
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Botero, et al (2004) and Calderon and Chong (2005) use the Botero et al  measures of 
labor laws introduced in exhibit1 to analyse aggregate outcome.  Botero et all report that 
across all countries in the data set the employment law and collective action indices are 
associated with lower utilization of labor overall and with higher unemployment for young 
workers.  Calderon and Chong (2005)  (table 6) regress growth rates on the Botero measures 
of labor codes and obtain an insignificant coefficient on the index of employment laws but a 
positive coefficient on an index for social security laws, that at face value implies that 
countries with social security laws grow more rapidly than others . 
  The labor subindex of the Fraser Institute, which the Institute reports at five-year 
intervals from 1970 to 2000 and yearly thereafter, provides another source of data on labor 
institutions across countries.  To see whether the labor subindex is associated with economic 
growth I estimated the following equation: 
  ∆Ln GDP = a + b INDEX + c LABOR + d ln GDP (-1) + Dc + Dt + uij 
where ∆Ln GDP is the annual growth rate in ln GDP per capita over each period, 1970-75, 
1975-1980, and so on through 2000 to 2004; INDEX is the Fraser index of economic 
freedom excluding the labor subindex; LABOR is the subindex of measures of minimum 
wages, hiring and firing practices, collective bargaining, unemployment benefits, and use of 
the draft; Dd are country dummy variables; and Dt are time dummy variables.  
  If market-driven economies improve growth, the b coefficient in this regression 
should be positive.  Similarly, if labor institutions harm growth the c coefficient will be 
positive.  The regression, which is summarized in appendix B, yields a significant positive 
coefficient on the INDEX variable for developing and advanced countries, which supports 
the notion that market-oriented economies enjoy higher growth.  But for both sets of  
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countries the coefficient on the LABOR measure is negative and insignificant, which rejects 
the hypothesis that labor institutions reduce the rate of growth. 
  In sum, there is no strong support for the proposition that labor institutions affect 
economic growth positively or negatively. 
8 Country Cases 
  Case studies of country experiences are the methodological polar opposite of cross 
country regressions.  Country studies allow analysts to use country-specific data rather than 
generic cross-country indicators and to situate their interpretations of the data in hopefully 
deep knowledge of country institutions and practices.  But country cases are not a random 
sample from the countries in the world, and they invite attention to country specifics – great 
leaders, particular events – that do not readily generalize.  Still, there is much to be learned 
from them. 
  In 1988 the World Bank initiated studies of labor market adjustments in twelve 
developing countries (Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Brazil; Ghana, Kenya, Egypt,  
Cote D’Ivoire; and Korea, Malaysia, Thailand).  The analysis (Horton, Kanbur, Mazumdar, 
1994) reached three conclusions: 1) “real wages were more flexible than generally supposed, 
which would support adjustment”; 2) “labor reallocation across sectors has been more or less 
in the desired direction” (ie toward tradable goods); and 3) “labor market institutions such as 
unions and minimum wages, often argued to be an impediment to adjustment, have more 
subtle effects on the workings of the labor market” (Preface, p x).   These conclusions fit with 
the econometric findings reviewed earlier and with the more measured view of labor 
institutions and economic outcomes that has emerged in recent years.     
  That labor institutions have modest impacts on economic performance on average 
does not mean that in particular situations they may not affect growth or help or hinder  
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economic adjustments.  Some countries in the Bank study underwent major changes after the 
researchers completed their empirical investigations – the Chilean economy improved 
greatly; Argentina went from boom to bust; Cote D’Ivoire suffered civil war; East Asia 
suffered financial crisis. Consideration of how labor institutions performed under these 
circumstances would enrich the conclusions of the Bank studies.  Much might also be learned 
by analyses of cases where institutions appear particularly harmful or beneficial to the 
economy or of institutions in countries with great growth failures or successes. From this 
perspective I examine next institutions in China’s move to a market economy and in 
Argentina’s recovery from economic meltdown.  
China 
  China’s transformation from communist planned economy to a market economy and 
entry to the global trading system is one of the most important developments in recent 
economic history.  As part of this shift, the country radically changed its labor market 
institutions.  From the 1960s through the late 1980s, China did not have a working labor 
market.  The state/party controlled the demand and supply of labor (Walder, 1986). The state 
was the primary employer. It set pay through a national pay grid and mandated benefits such 
as health care, retirement, and housing.  It controlled hiring and firing and assigned workers 
to jobs.  It limited migration through Hukou residency restrictions.  Fearing that unemployed 
urban youth might create a social problem in the 1980s, the state encouraged older workers to 
retire by promising to assign their jobs to their offspring.  
  Shifting from communist planning to markets in the mid 1980s through the 1990s, 
China freed firms and workers to make demand and supply decisions.  It gave management of 
state-owned enterprises authority to hire and fire and introduce performance linked wages. It 
allowed greater private employment. In the 1990s it privatized many small and medium state- 
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owned enterprises and laid off several million workers from state enterprises.  It weakened 
the Hukou system. With opportunity to find work, buy food, and obtain housing in the 
market, upwards of 100-150 million workers moved from rural to urban areas -- the largest 
internal migration in history.  Workers and firms matched themselves in the job market rather 
than relying on state assignment. 
  Could China have successfully transitioned to a market economy with its pre-labor 
market institutions? Studies of wages, employment, and productivity during China’s growth 
spurt suggest that the labor market reforms were an essential part of China’s success (Meng 
2000; Knight and Song 2005).  Wages for skilled work increased, raising the return to 
education. Tens of millions found work in the private sector.  Productivity rose in state 
owned enterprises.  It is hard to imagine these changes occurring with the state setting pay 
and assigning workers to jobs, though it is hard to imagine a counterfactual test for this 
assertion. 
  The new Chinese labor market produced a huge income gap between rich and poor, 
evinced in a Gini coefficient that reached US levels by 2005, disturbing Party leaders, who 
worried about “mounting public anger over inequality and corruption” (Eckholm, 2001). To 
deal with these concerns, China enacted a new labor code in 2007 that required employers 
give written contracts to workers, restricted use of temporary laborers, made lay offs more 
difficult, and strengthened the power of the All China Federation of Trade Unions to organize 
and to bargain for wages and benefits. With World Bank (2006b) advice, the government 
sought to establish a national pension system.  China’s effort to develop labor institutions to 
reduce income inequality and insure against social disorder reflects a very different 
perspective on the role institutions in development than the fear that institutions are inimical 




  In the 1990s Argentina was the poster child of globalization and Washington 
Consensus policies.  With the advice and assistance of the IMF, the country pegged the peso 
to the dollar, privatized many public enterprises, loosened controls on banking and foreign 
currency, and greatly increased the market orientation of its economy. Between 1990 and 
2000, Argentina rose in the economic freedom index of the Fraser Institute (which measures  
reliance on market forces rather than institutions) from 84th in the world to 27th.  Seemingly 
reflecting these changes, the Argentine economy grew rapidly in the 1990s, although with 
double digit unemployment and increased inequality.  At its fall 1999 meeting, the IMF 
lionized Argentine President Carlos Menem for his economic stewardship, and he responded 
by thanking the IMF for its guidance. Washington Consensus? Think Argentina. 
  Two years later, the Argentine economy collapsed.  The value of the Peso dropped to 
1/3
rd of the dollar, interest rates zoomed, real GDP fell by 18% and unemployment rose to 
21.5%.  Poverty increased greatly. The government froze bank accounts.  In winter 2001 
Argentina went through five Presidents or acting Presidents in less than two months. Angry 
protestors filled downtown Buenos Aires.  The government gave up dollarization.  It refused 
to meet the demands by the IMF and creditors to repay loans quickly. It funded an emergency 
unemployment benefits program and worked with Peronist unions to lessen social disorder. 
These institutions helped Argentina maintain its democracy and social stability.  The country 
went on to a strong recovery based on an export-led boom that lowered unemployment and 
poverty. As with China’s development of a labor market, there is no good counterfactual to 
assess how Argentina might have fared if it had weaker labor institutions or chosen to 
suppress protesters and unions to repay its international debts. But during the crisis labor 
institutions helped maintain political and economic order.  
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9.  The Informal Sector  
  The majority of workers in developing countries work in the informal sector.
18 The 
traditional view has been that economic growth shrinks the informal sector and that as it 
does, more workers will gain the higher pay and economic security of the formal sector.  This 
underlies the unease that 1990 World Bank Development Report expressed toward labor 
institutions: if only unions and governments leave well enough alone, the natural process will 
move workers out of the low productivity informal sector into good formal sector jobs. 
  The employment data summarized in Exhibit 5 contravene the picture of a naturally 
declining informal sector for the 1980s-2000s when the informal sector expanded its share of 
global employment, even in developing countries with rapid economic growth.  Line 1 
indicates that the proportion of workers in self employment increased in every region in the 
1980s and 1990s. Line 2 shows that the non paid share of employment  (the self-employed, 
employers, members of cooperatives, contributing family members and non-classified 
workers) increased.  Line 3, which gives estimates of informal sector employment in eight of 
the ten most populous developing countries from a diverse set of country sources, tells a 
similar story.  In seven of the countries the informal sector share of employment rose while it 
held stable in Indonesia. 
19Line 4 shows that even in Korea, arguably the world’s greatest 
growth success, the informal sector remains a large and growing share of the work force. 
  The shocker in exhibit 5 is that informal sector employment rose in rapidly growing 
countries such as China, India, and the Philippines, and Korea as well as in countries with 
                                                 
18     The ILO defines informal sector employment as self-employed; wage workers in 
insecure and unprotected jobs (unregistered, casual, temporary); household workers.  
19   Data for particular countries not covered in the table confirm the trend.  ILO (2001) 
estimates that the informal share of employment rose in 12 Latin American countries for 
which it obtained data.  Scattered estimates show informal employment up in Ghana, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria.   
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anemic growth records.  Why did rapid growth fail to shrink the informal sector? One likely 
reason is that productivity growth in the modern sector was so great that even massive 
expansion of output does not increase employment.  China is instructive in this respect.  
Despite becoming the world’s manufacturing center in the 2000s, China had fewer workers in 
manufacturing in 2002 than in 1987 (Bannister, 2005b, table 1).  Presumably this is because 
it adopted modern labor-saving technology, though it could also reflect Chinese firms 
outsourcing manufacturing jobs to the informal sector.20    
  Traditional models of developing country labor markets treat the informal sector as a 
last choice safety net where individuals seek employment when nothing is available in the 
formal sector.  But this is not the full story.  Some workers and firms may prefer the informal 
sector to avoid taxes and regulations and may make relatively good livings in those sectors.   
Studies of sectoral mobility for Mexico (Bosch and Maloney, 2007), Brazil (Bosch, Goni and 
Maloney, 2007), and Chile (Packard, 2007) show that formal/informal boundaries are porous, 
with many workers shifting from one sector to the other in response to economic changes. 
The dynamics of mobility in the sectors may, however, differ.   Hoek (2007) finds that in the 
Brazilian formal sector, reductions in employment take the form of a reduced job finding rate 
while in the informal sector, reductions in employment take the form of higher separation 
rates.  Ulyssea and Szerman (2007) find that more educated and older workers had longer job 
duration in the formal sector and shorter duration in the informal sector. They also show a 
rapid decline in the hazard rate for exiting the informal sector that implies long spells if 
workers do not leave within 6 months. 
                                                 
20   Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven (2005) show that rapid growth reduces the informal 
sector share of output while labor and product market regulations raise the informal sector 
share of GDP.  There is no inconsistency between their regressions of the informal share of 
output on growth and the failure of observed growth to reduce informal sector shares of  
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    Comparisons of wages across sectors and activities shows that in Mexico and Brazil 
employees in the informal sector earn less than employees in the formal sector but that the 
self-employed earn as much or more than formal sector workers (Maloney, 2000, Bosch, 
Goni and Maloney, 2007).  Still, workers laid off from formal sector manufacturing suffer 
earnings decline of nearly 50% one year later and about 33% two years later, with middle 
aged workers hit hardest by a layoff (Hoek 2006).  For El Salvador and Peru, Marcouiller et al 
(1997) find that informal sector workers earned significantly less than formal sector workers. 
In Argentina poverty among older persons is greater the greater the proportion of their 
working lives spent in the informal sector.  
    Given the size and persistence of the informal sector in developing economies, we 
need more studies of how workers fare in this sector, of the links between formal and 
informal job markets, and of possible innovative social insurance schemes to improve the 
working lives of those in the informal sector, be it through social security pensions 
(Auerbach, et al 2007), occupational health and safety laws, increased enforcement of 
regulations (Almeida and Carneiro, 2007) or perhaps through associations of the self-
employed like SEWA (http://www.sewa.org/) and so on.  
Conclusion  
    This review has found that regulations and unions are not the bugbear to development 
that many believed them to be years ago. Some labor policies have adverse effects on 
employment in some countries but the magnitudes are generally modest.  Evidence on the 
wage curve, the spillover of minimum wages to the informal sector, and the mobility of 
workers between the informal and formal sectors show that the two-sector model that has 
guided much thinking about labor markets in developing countries does not capture the way 




those markets operate. The evidence suggests instead that labor markets adjust to conditions 
in developing countries much as they do in advanced countries and do not impede macro-
economic adjustments.  The Chinese example suggests that a functioning labor market can 
help development while the Argentine example suggests that labor institutions can help 
preserve social stability during turbulent times. 
    The 800 pound gorilla in this review is the increased share of the informal sector in 
successful developing countries. Because research has focused largely on formal sector labor 
markets, we know far too little about the informal market setting in which most workers 
make their living, about policies and institutions that can help raise productivity in the 
informal sector, improve occupational health and safety, and deliver social services and 
protections to workers.  The informal sector is going to be the locus of work for the majority 




Exhibit 1: Average values (standard deviations in brackets), of Measures of Labor 




































































































            
 
 
Source: Tabulated from country data in Fraser (2007), Botero et al, World 
Economic Forum as given in appendix table, with countries classified by 
World Bank income levels.  Recently developed countries include high 
income countries outside the major Western countries. 
 
                                                 
21     The correlations among the six indicators.   
               Fraser Institute   Employment law    Collective relations law   Union density    Wage setting 
  Fraser Institute       1.000     
  Employment law      0.435           1.000  
 Collective  relations 
   law                            0.390         0.487                      1.000 
  Union density             0.092         0.317                      0.113                       1.000 
  Wage setting              0.346           0.211                    0.139                       0.171           1.000 








Exhibit 2:  Dispersion of Earnings by Occupation and Industry, by income level of 
countries  
 





















B) Industrial Earnings  
 
 





































































Source: A, Freeman and Oostendorp, 2002 
              B,  Penn World Table (v6.2); ILO (2006) 











































Exhibit 3: Studies of Minimum Wage in Developing Countries, 1990s-2007 
 
 
Area, study, year  Nature of data  Findings   
BRAZIL Lemos (2006,2004)  
 
Individual data  Compresses distribution in informal and 
covered, 2006 no effect on employment; 
2004 some
Chile, Montenegro and Pages 
(2004) 
Changes in minimum, 
1960-1998, individual 
data 
Minimum shifts employment from young and 
unskilled workers to older and female 
workers   
Costa Rica Gindling & Terrell 
(2007, 2005, 1995)   
 
Individual data  Raises wages in informal + formal 1995 
study: no loss of employment in formal; gain 
in informal; 2007, minimum lowers 
employment in public sector 
Honduras,  Gindling & Terrell 
(2007) 
Individual data to 
establish spikes, sectors 
and size of firm over 
time, 1990-2004 
1% increase in the minimum wage  increases 
wage in medium and large firms by  0.29% in 
the average wage; reduces employment by -
0.46%; does not affect small firms where 
employment grows 
Columbia, Arango and Pachon  
2004 
Panel date for cities, 
1984-2001 
Improves earnings of families high in income 
distribution, reduces it in bottom quintile; 
reduces employment, especially for women, 
young, less educated    
Columbia, Mexico Bell (1997) 
 
Firm level data   No effect in Mexico; effect in Columbia; 
Mexico (Bosch and Manacorda 
(2007) 
Individual  Minimum shifts distribution for uncovered as 
well as covered; small employment effect 
Mexico (Feliciano, 1998)  Cross state panel data, 
1970-1990 
Decline in real value of Mexican minimum 
wage increased employment of women with 
elasticity between -.58 and -1.25.   
Trinidad &Tobago Strobl & 
Walsh (2003),  
 
Individual with  
longitudinal job loss 
Spikes shows that min affects wages, lowers 
employment of affected group   
Puerto Rico Castillo-Freeman 
& Freeman (1992),  
 
Spike, Uses imposition of 
US min wage 
W, modest E ε ~-0.10; large fall in 
employment in very small industries   
LA + Caribbean,  Kristensen & 
Cunningham (2006),  
 
Individual data, focus on 
spikes  
In 10 countries minimum affects informal 
and covered; 4 it affects only informal   
LA Maloney and Nunez 
Mendez(2004), LA 
 
Individual wage to 
establish spikes in formal 
and informal sectors 
Longitudinal job loss 
Affects distribution in 6 of 8 LA countries 
Stronger effect on informal in Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay; employment 
losses in Columbia; job loss greater for low 
wage   
LA Maloney et al (2001)  
 
Spikes in wage data  Four yes, three no   
LA, Lustig & McCleod, 1997, 
x-country 
 
Aggregate poverty 1990s 
vs 1980s 
Reduces poverty 




Area, study, year  Nature of data  Findings 
    
 
Indonesia Alatas & Cameron (2003)  
 
 
Individual W spike, firm E 
geographic time series 
 
Wage effects; no E in large firms; 
some in small 
 
Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse, 
2003) 
 
Plant level data over time 
 
Compliance with minimum wage 
rises  1990-99 with both 
multinationals and exporting firms 
more likely to comply with labor 
standards 
 




Modest wage, little effect on 
aggregate employment but shift in 
employment from small firms 
Indonesia SMERU (2001)  Individual data from National 
Labor Force Surveys; Firm-based 
survey; province level panel for 
employment 1988-1999 
Spikes in minimum wages for blue 
collar workers but not others;  
compliance rises with firm size and 
increased over time; .estimated 
elasticity of total employment – 
0.112, larger for females, youths, 




Individual wage data; time series 
21 years 
Spike at minimum in distribution; 
in informal as well as covered.    
W, E shift to informal  ε ~-0.10 
 
Many countries Squire & Suthiwart-
Narueput (1997) 
 
Changes in minimum among 
countries, 1970-90 
 
Real minimums fall in 16/23  
Min/Average falls in 6/17  
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Exhibit 4: Studies of Union Effects in Developing Countries 
 
Country wage  dispersion turnover benefits productivity profits  Other 
Mexico 10-15%  lower  lower  higher  higher  none  Increased 
training 
Uruguay  5%?     Lower     higher higher  Lowers  elasticity 
of demand  
Guatamala              Lower in 
cross-section, 
not in fixed 
effects 
     




 Lower in 
all cases 
 Higher capital 
labor ratios 







 More likely to 
go to profit-
sharing 
South Africa  10-20%, 
bigger for 
blacks 
lower     higher        Lowers 
coefficients on 
other variables  
in earnings  
Ghana  6-16%  Lower                
Cameroons a  14%  Lower                
Cameroons b  -8% to -11%             
Senegal -13%           
Zimbabwe  -17%            14%       








lower higher  Works  council 
raises 
   Unions lower, 
WC raises job 
sat;  substitute 
non-standard 
 
Source: Mexico Fairris (2003, 2005);  Popli (2006), Maloney and Ribiero (1999), Panagides 
and Patrinos (1994);  Uruguay, Cassoni, Labadie & Fachola (2001), Cassoni, Allen, and 
Labidie  (2000); Peru, Saavedra and Torero (2005); Brazil, Menezes-Filho, Zylberstajn, 
Chahd, Pazello (2005), Arbache, 1998; Guatamala Urizar and Lee (2005) 
South Africa, Kingdon, Sandefur, Teal (2004),; Butcher and Rouse (2001); Hofmeyr & 
Lucas (2001), Schultz and Mwabu (1998),; Moll (1993); P-C Michaud and 
D.Vencatachellum (2001); Ghana, Blunch and Verner (2004); Verner (1999); Cameroon, a, 
Tsafack-Nanfosso (2007), 1999 survey of 1,074 wage earners; b, Miller and Vallee (1995) 
and Vallee and Thomas (1994), 1993 and 1994 survey; Senegal  Terrell and Svejnar (1989);  
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Zimbabwe (Verner, 1999); Malaysia   Standing (1992) ; Korea, Lee and Na (2004); Fields 
and Yoo,(2000)  Park, 1991; Cheon, 2006  
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Exhibit 5:  Indicators of the trend in the informal sector share of employment 
 
1)  Self-employment share of non-agricultural Employment (ILO 2002) 1980s to 1990s 
 World      26%  to  32% 
            Africa         44% to 48%   
Latin America       29% to 44% 
    Asia           26% to 32% 
 
2.  Unpaid Workers as Share of Total Employment (ILO, LaborSta, 2007), 1993-2002 
  World      55%  to  60% 
          Developing Countries 
          Advanced Countries   
   
3.
 22  Selected Country measures, by population of country  
China  1990 to 2005    51% to 52.8% 
India     1993/4 to 2004/5 92.7% to 94.1% 
Indonesia 1990 to 2003   28.2% to 28.2% 
Brazil Urban  1990 to 2003: 40.6% to 44.6% 
Pakistan, urban 1997/8 to 2001/2  64.6% to 66.5% 
Bangladesh to 2000s                                to 65% 
Nigeria, urban 1960s  to 2005   25% to 45%-60%   
1970s to 1990s  50% to 65%
Mexico 1991 to 1998 61.2% to 63.6% 
Philippines Vietnam 2000s   70% 
 
4.  Informal Sector Employment in Korea, by definition  
    Self-employed 1990 to 2004              39.5% to 34.0% 
    Non-regular  2001 to 2005    26.8% to 36.6% 
    Temporary   2001 to 2005    16.6% to 29.4% 
    Non-standard  1990 -2004    45.8% to 48.8% 
 
Source:  Line 1, ILO, Women and Men in the Informal Economy: a statistical picture (ILO, 
2002), table 2.5 
Line 2, Estimated from ILO, Laborstats, 2007 
Line 3, China, India, Brazil from OECD, March 2007, table 1.1;  Indonesia, Felipe and 
Hasan, 2006, Pakistan, Gennari, 2004; Nigeria a, Nwaka 2005; Nigeria b, , Mexico, Martin 
2000, table 4; Philippines, Venida; UN, ILO; 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/informal/who.htm  for Bangladesh 
Line 4  Korea, 1990-2004  OECD, Factbook 2006, Economic, Environmental, and Social 
Statistics, Self employment rates as percentage of total civilian employment 2001-2005, 
defined as non-regular;  temporary, OECD, Korea, table 5.13; 1990-2004, Ki Seong Park 
2006, Non-standard employment, figure 1 
                                                 
22    China, India, Brazil from OECD, 2007, table 1.A.3 For Indonesia Wiebe reports 68% for 1993; 
http://www.socialalert.org/pdf/IndonesieBROCH%5B1%5D.pdf reports over half informal in 2000s. 
 http://indonesiaurbanstudies.blogspot.com/2007/05/urban-planning-and-informal-sector-in.html reports 
64%   
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Uganda 8.6  0.35  0.38  3.9  6.3  5.0 
Zambia  8.6  0.15 0.29  12.5 --  -- 
Pakistan 7.8  0.34  0.31  5.5  5.7  4.5 
Haiti 7.3  na  na  --  --  -- 
Bangladesh 6.7  na  na  4.3  5.3  4.0 
Ghana 6.2  0.29  0.48  25.9  3.7  4.4 
Kenya 5.8  0.37  0.23  16.9  5  4.9 
India 5.7  0.44  0.38  5.4  5.4  2.6 
Malawi 5.7  0.18  0.25  --  5  3.5 
Nigeria 5.5  0.19  0.21  17.2  4.6  4.5 
Mongolia 5.4  0.33  0.23  --  5.9  4.6 
Zimbabwe 5.2  0.25  0.44  13.9  2.8  2.2 
Tanzania 5.1  0.68  0.32  17.4  4.5  3.7 
Vietnam 4.8  0.54  0.48  --  5.4  4.2 
Benin 4.1  na  na  --  5.3  4.1 
Chad 3.7  na  na  --  5.4  3.6 
Mali 3.6  na  na  13.7  4.5  3.4 
Madagascar 3.1  0.47  0.46    5.3  3.6 
Senegal  2.8  0.51 0.57  21.9 --  -- 
Mozambique 2.5  0.79  0.58  --  8.7  3.6 
Guyana 8.2  na  na  25.2  5.1  4.5 
Namibia 7.2  na  na  22.0  4.3  3.0 
Thailand 7.0  0.41  0.36  3.1  4.7  4.2 
Nicaragua 6.8  na  na  23.4  5.5  3.7 
Cameroon 6.6  na  na  14.7  4.8  3.6 
Jamaica 6.6  0.16  0.23  --  5.5  4.0 
Jordan 6.6  0.7  0.38  --  5.9  3.4 
Georgia 6.5  0.77  0.57  --  6.0  4.9 
Sri Lanka  6.4  0.47  0.51  --  4.5  2.7 
Dominican Rep.  6.0  0.6  0.27  17.3  5.1  3.9 
Macedonia 5.8  na  na  --  5.5  3.3 
Albania 5.7  na  na  --  5.7  4.8 
El Salvador  5.5  na  na  7.2  5.5  4.9 
Azerbaijan 5.4  na  na  --  5.2  4.7 
Egypt 5.3  0.37  0.41  29.6  5.9  3.9 
Armenia 5.2  0.6  0.52  --  5.6  4.9 
Indonesia 5.0  0.68  0.39  2.6  4.2  3.6 
Philippines 5.0  0.48  0.51  22.8  4.4  2.6 
Honduras 4.9  na  na  4.5  4.3  3.1 
Ukraine 4.8  0.66  0.58  --  5.0  4.8 
Bolivia 4.8  0.37  0.46  16.4  5.4  3.1 
China 4.7  0.43  0.33  54.7*  5.2  4.5 
Colombia 4.3  0.34  0.49  7  5.5  3.8 
Tunisia 4.3  0.82  0.38  9.8  3.7  4.2 
Peru 4.3  0.46  0.71  7.5  5.7  3.3 
Guatemala 4.2  na  ns  4.4  4.4  3.6 
Ecuador 4.2  0.4  0.64  9.8  4.5  3.0  
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Morocco 4.1  0.26  0.49  4.8  5.1  3.7 
Algeria 3.7  na  na    3.9  3.4 
Paraguay 2.9  na  na  9.3  3.8  2.7 
Malaysia 7.9  0.19  0.19  11.7  5.6  4.0 
Uruguay 7.3  0.28  0.35  11.6  5.0  3.7 
Hungary 7.1  0.38  0.61  52.5  5.7  4.0 
Mauritius 6.7  na  na  25.9  3.1  3.6 
Slovak Rep.  6.6  0.66  0.45  52.3  5.6  4.8 
Botswana 6.5  na  na  11.5  5.1  3.7 
Costa Rica  6.1  na  na  13.1  4.4  4.1 
Bulgaria 6.0  0.52  0.44  51.4  5.6  4.5 
Russia 5.8  0.83  0.58  74.8*  5.6  5.0 
Latvia 5.8  0.72  0.53  --  5.7  3.9 
Panama 5.6  0.62  0.46  14.2  4.0  3.0 
Mexico 5.5  0.59  0.58  31  5.0  3.0 
Croatia 5.5  0.49  0.45  --  5.1  3.8 
Lithuania 5.4  0.62  0.5  --  5.8  3.1 
Chile 5.3  0.47  0.38  15.9  6.1  3.4 
South Africa  5.1  0.32  0.54  21.8  3.4  2.3 
Argentina 5.1  0.34  0.58  25.4  4.0  2.7 
Brazil 5.0  0.57  0.38  32.1  4.1  3.1 
Romania 5.0  0.33  0.57  40.7  5.6  3.1 
Poland 4.8  0.64  0.57  27.0  5.0  3.5 
Turkey 4.3  0.4  0.47  22.0  5.1  3.5 
Venezuela 3.5  0.65  0.54  14.9  4.2  1.9 
Unit. Arab Em.  8.9  na  na  --  6.3  5.0 
Kuwait 8.6  na  na  --  6.1  4.5 
Hong Kong  8.6  0.17  0.46  18.5  6.4  5.8 
Bahrain 7.4  na  na  --  6.2  3.1 
Trinidad & Tob.  7.1  na  na  --  4.9  4.0 
Singapore 6.9  0.31  0.34  13.5  6.0  5.9 
Malta 6.8  na  na  57.9  5.1  3.0 
Estonia 6.1  na  na  26.4  6.2  4.4 
Slovenia 5.6  0.74  0.49  --  4.6  2.9 
Taiwan 5.3  0.45  0.32  27.9  6.2  4.6 
Israel 4.8  0.29  0.31  23.1  5.1  4.4 
Cyprus 3.1  na  na  53.7  4.2  3.3 
Iceland 8.0  na  na  70.7  4.5  5.4 
United States  7.9  0.22  0.26  12.7  6.1  5.4 
Switzerland 7.4  0.45  0.42  20.0  5.8  5.4 
Canada 7.1  0.26  0.2  31.0  5.6  4.3 
Japan 7.0  0.16  0.63  18.6  5.9  3.6 
United Kingdom  6.9  0.28  0.19  26.2  5.9  4.4 
Australia 6.6  0.35  0.37  28.6  4.6  3.5 
New Zealand  6.5  0.16  0.25  23.2  5.8  3.8 
Spain 6.2  0.74  0.59  11.4  4.8  2.9 
Portugal 5.9  0.88  0.65  18.8  4.4  2.8 
Ireland 5.8  0.34  0.46  36.0  3.2  3.4 
France 5.7  0.74  0.67  6.1  4.6  2.4 
Luxembourg 5.7  na  na  39.5  4.3  3.2 
Italy 5.5  0.65  0.63  30.6  3.3  2.6 
Netherlands 5.4  0.73  0.46  21.8  3.1  2.8 
Denmark 5.1  0.57  0.42  68.2  4.2  5.4 
Belgium 5.0  0.51  0.42  38.1  3.0  2.6 
Czech Rep.  5.0  0.52  0.34  36.3  5.6  3.5  
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South Korea  4.9  0.45  0.54  9.0  5.5  4.1 
Austria 4.4  0.5  0.36  36.6  2.7  3.8 
Norway 4.2  0.69  0.65  51.7  3.9  3.0 
Greece 4.0  0.52  0.49  15.4  3.4  2.9 
Finland 3.9  0.74  0.32  59.7  2.5  3.6 
Sweden 3.5  0.74  0.54  77.2  3.3  2.4 




Appendix B:  Regression: 
 
Coefficients (Std Errors) on Regression of Annual Growth rates of GDP per capita on the 
labor subindex and the economic freedom index of the Fraser institute (with the labor 
subindex removed), 1970-2004 
 
 
Lagged GDP per capita                                            -.066 (.007) 
Labor subindex for developing countries           -.002 (.002)  
Economic freedom index* for developing countries           .010(.002) 
Labor subindex for OECD countries                   -.001 (.002) 
Economic freedom index* for OECD countries         .009 (.003)  
Year  Dummies       yes 
Country  Dummies        yes 
Number of observations             314 




Indices of Economic Freedom, Fraser Institute 2006  
Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson (2006). Economic Freedom of the World: 2006 Annual 




Labor subindex. Listed as 5B on the data set  
Economic freedom index *  Simple average of subindices for separate areas, excluding the 
labor subindex.  Analysis using the full economic freedom index gives comparable results, 
but then has the labor index entered in two places  
 
GDP growth rates – Change in natural log of real GDP/capita in const prices (Laspeyres) from 
Penn World Tables divided by number of years (5 years except 4 years for 2000-2004) 
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